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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW -

1960 TENNESSEE SURVEY

A. E. RYMAN, JR.*
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This survey is directed to the law peculiar to local government.
Although nearly every case involves law applicable to parties other

than governmental agencies, the focus of attention here is on the
aspects peculiar to such agencies. Critique of the law of general
application is not within the scope of this article.
Although "Elections and Representation" could be treated (as it
was last year) under the topic of "Relations of Local Government and
Private Persons," it is separated here to emphasize the logical distinction between laws concerned with the creation of governmental
agencies on the theory that power is derivative from consent of
the people, and laws concerned with the relations between individual
persons and an established government.

I. FINANciAL POLICY
The policy of aid and comfort to industrial activity noted in the
review of McConnel v. Lebanon last year' was reaffirmed in a declaratory judgment action brought by Mayor West of Nashville.2 The
supreme court opinion by Justice Prewitt sustained Chancellor
Lentz's decree approving execution of a lease of land by Nashville to
the Industrial Development Board to be improved by the Board and
re-leased to Genesco, a private corporation.
Holding that encouraging industrial activity is a public purpose
*Professor of Law, Cumberland University; member, Colorado Bar.
1. Ryman, Local Government Law-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 VAND. L.

REV. 1257 (1959).

2. West v. Industrial Dev. Bd., 332 S.W.2d 201 (Tenn. 1960).
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and therefore a proper city action, the court cited Holly v. City of
Elizabethton3 to the effect that if the financing of such a venture is
not provided by the city through a charge on tax revenues, but is
to be accomplished through bonds repayable only from earnings of
the project, then the public credit is not pledged within the meaning
of article 2, section 29 of the Tennessee Constitution.
If the public credit is pledged, as in the McConnell case, a referendum election is required. If the public credit is not pledged to repay
outlay for the project, no such election is required, according to the
Holly case, which was followed in the West case.
The extensive governmental activity permitted by these cases and
recent legislation 4 indicates a clear policy, but it also opens the
possibility of considerable abuse. Perhaps some registration and
prospectus laws would be in order, coupled with legislative standards
for financial responsibility of persons or corporations to benefit from
public assisted programs.
II.

ELECTIONS AND REPRESENTATION

A. Notice to Voters: Substantial Compliance
The validity of an incorporation election was sustained by Chancellor Townsend in Seaver v. Shaver, and his decision was affirmed by
the Tennessee Supreme Court.5 In the supreme court opinion, Justice
Prewitt cited State ex rel. Williams v. Jones6 and cases cited therein
for the proposition that: "This court . . . will not permit trifling irregularities to defeat the will of the majority as expressed at the
polls."
To establish that the substitution of a new first page of a petition
requesting an incorporation election was a "trifling irregularity" the
court stated that the description of area included within the proposed
municipality was "substantially the same" as the original first page,
and that no prejudice occurred because complainants and the legal
voters were well advised at the time of and prior to the election of
the territory to be included.
There seems to be an implication that a proper remedy for known
irregularities in a petition for an election is injunction before the
election is held. Such a course is reasonable, and obviates the expense
of repetitive elections and use of technical objections to defeat the
majority intention.
3. 193 Tenn. 46, 241 S.W.2d 1001 (1951).

4. Ryman, supra note 1.
5. 331 S.W.2d 288 (Tenn. 1960).
6. 179 Tenn. 206, 164 S.W.2d 823 (1942).
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B. Annexation
The problem of annexation is included under this heading because
one main issue involved in such proceedings is that of representation,
although the Tennessee Supreme Court evaded the problem in Morton
7
v. Johnson City.
By the terms of Tennessee Code Annotated section 6-3098 two
methods of municipal annexation are established in addition to the
9
referendum method of section 6-301. The first alternative method
may be referred to as the voluntary method; it requires a petition of
a majority of the residents and property owners of the "affected
territory." The second alternative method can be classed as involuntary; it allows the ordinance making body of a municipality to
annex by ordinance after notice and public hearing.
In the Johnson City case, the supreme court had before it a quo
warranto contest 10 of an involuntary annexation. By the decision, the
court effectively negatived the public hearing feature of the statute
by holding that the hearing might be held in a room too small to
accommodate a substantial number of those wishing to participate.
The court seemed to feel that the sole purpose of such a meeting is a
parade of petitioners, negativing any possible effect of developing
public opinion, or affecting official opinion, through group discussion.
The court went so far as to approve refusal by the city council to
move to an available larger room. It appears that mere formal gestures
are a sufficient compliance with the notice and hearing requirements.
The involuntary annexation method adopted by Tennessee in 1955
is a variation of a Missouri statute which was proposed in substantially the form adopted by Wallace Mendelson, a political scientist
at the University of Tennessee and consultant to the Municipal
Technical Advisory Service, in an article in 8 Vanderbilt Law Review
1. The proposals were stimulated by the limitation on annexation by
private act contained in Amendment VII to the Tennessee Constitution.'2 The involuntary annexation method presents three distinct
problems in addition to the matter of compliance with, and necessity
for, provisions for notice and hearing by those affected.
1. Right to Representation.-The slogan "Annexation without Representation" leading to "Taxation without Representation" could be
truthfully adopted by those affected by the Johnson City annexation.
American courts have consistently refused to hold they have juris-

7. 333 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. 1960).
8. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 6-309 (Supp. 1959).
9. TENN.CODE ANN. § 6-301 (1956).

TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-309 (Supp. 1959).
11. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 75.020 (1952), construed in State v. City of Joplin, 332
Mo. 1193, 62 S.W.2d 393 (1933), referred to by Mr. Mendelson.
12. 7 VAND. L. REv. 768 (1954).

10.
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diction to review undemocratic actions. 3 The federal guarantee of a
"republican form of government" has never been effectuated through
judicial sanction. Courts are wont to label such claims as "political"
rather than judicial.14 While the number and classes of persons entitled to be enfranchised has consistently increased in the United
States, the effective power of the individual's franchise has decreased,
not only by reason of the increased number of persons entitled .to
vote, but primarily because of attenuation through delegation of
government actions to non-elective officers. The watering process is
clearly presented in annexation problems and in extra-territorial
zoning.15 The persons affected, or their ancestors or predecessors in
title, may have had a vote for some member or members of the
legislative body which delegated legislative power to municipalities,
but they have no political control over the legislative determination
of the administrative agency.
The courts have said that enforcement of democratic process is
political if the court is not provided with a specific criterion either by
constitution or legislation. 6 It would appear that a mathematical
formula could be established to ascertain the degree of remoteness
of representation. For example: A theoretically perfect ratio would
be a vote on every issue by every person affected directly, i.e., 1: 1.
An outside limit could be established based upon the degree of
remoteness of the voter from the final decision maker. If every person
had a right to vote annually on each person making political decisions
affecting the voter, an arbitrary ratio of 1:2 could be established. If
the individual voted for a person who appointed a decision maker,
a ratio of 1:3 would then follow on the same basis. If the vote were
for a person who had one of two votes for a decision maker, a ratio
of 1:4 would follow. If one-half of the voters affected by a decision
voted annually on the decision maker, a ratio of 1:4 would result.
If the vote were held every two years by all affected persons on the
decision maker, the ratio would be 1:4. A major problem would arise
in even attempting to define what persons were "affected" by a
decision, and periodic review and re-enactment of laws would be a
necessary corollary of such a concept.
If powers continue to be delegated as they are now, such legislation
will be necessary to preserve a semblance of democracy.
In many cases the lack of representation is curable by affording
parties affected by decisions a judicial remedy. This is the theory of
13. See, e.g., Morton v. Johnson City, supra note 7, and City of St. Joseph

v. Hankinson, 312 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. 1958).
14. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 145 (1956) at note 69. See also Annot,
66 A.L.R. 1466 (1930).
15. See 8 VAq. L.Rnv. 806 (1955).
16. 16 C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 145 (1956) at 700.
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limitation or governmental power through an independent judiciary
which protects vested private rights. The degree of protection afforded
is affected by the scope of judicial review and by the substantive law
granting private rights and/or remedies. The scope of judicial review
in annexation cases is discussed herein under the next heading. The
question of remedies in general is not present since Tennessee Code
Annotated section 6-310 provides for a quo warranto proceeding.
Capacity to contest annexation in general is discussed in Annotations,
13 A.L.R.2d 1279 (1950) and 18 A.L.R.2d 1255 (1951).
2. Delegation of Legislative Power.-If section 6-309 provided for a
commission on annexation which might hold a hearing and order
annexation where necessary, there would be no doubt that the statute,
absent specific criteria, woUld be an unlawful delegation of power. 17
The criterion included in that act is "the prosperity of such municipality and territory will be materially retarded and the safety and
welfare of the inhabitants and property thereof endangered .. . [if
annexation is not affected]." (Emphaiis added.) There is no question
of the power of the judiciary to review actions of administrative
bodies to ascertain whether the criterion on which the power of the
administrative agency depends in fact existed in any particular case.
In general review is limited to whether the agency acted within
its authority 18 and whether there is material evidence to sustain the
facts found by the agency.19
Although logically it would seem that whether the facts in the
Johnson City case actually were such as to fall within the statutory
criterion would go to the authority of the city council to authorize
annexation and that the issue would be a mixed question of law and
fact subject to review by trial of that issue to a jury, there is authority
for the proposition that such questions are reviewable only for arbitrariness; such was the holding in Missouri, and that holding might
reasonably be said to have been adopted by the legislature of Tennessee because of the legislative history of its statute.2 0 On that
authority the question to be determined would be whether there was
material evidence presented at the administrative hearing which
supports the action of the City Council. Section 6-310, which provides for quo warranto to attack the validity of such annexation, is
not clear. In paragraph one the ground for the proceeding is "that
17. Recognized but not applied in City of St. Joseph v. Hankinson, 312
S.W.2d 4, 8 (Mo. 1958), citing 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 139 (1956) and
69 A.L.R. 266 (1930) inter alia.
18. State v. Yoakum, 201 Tenn. 180, 297 S.W.2d 635 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 27-901 to -914 (1956).
19. Milne Chair Co. v. Hake, 190 Tenn. 395, 230 S.W.2d 393 (1950). See
Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1280 (1951).

20. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
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it reasonably may not be deemed necessary for the welfare of the
residents and property owners . . .and so constitutes an exercise of
power not conferred by law. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Paragraph two
provides that in multiple suits consolidated for trial the issue shall be
"whether ... annexation be or be not unreasonable in consideration
of the health, safety and welfare of the citizens and property owners.
." (Emphasis added.)
The Tennessee Supreme Court did not adopt either of the theories
above noted, but held that the ordinance was presumed valid.
3. Presumption of Reasonableness.-The power of the legislature
was delegated by section 6-309 to the ordinance making body of
municipal corporations. The court held in the Johnson City case
that such a body was a legislative organization (impliedly distinguished from an administrative agency) and their annexation ordinance was entitled to the presumption of validity.
If the council were acting on a delegated legislative power in a
manner affecting only residents within the municipality who were
enfranchised and whom the council represented, such a presumption
would not be subject to criticism. Such, however, is not the case in
annexation or extra-territorial zoning matters.
The seriousness of this distinction can be readily ascertained by
reviewing the Johnson City case. A jury was impaneled, and heard
several days of testimony. The jury viewed the territory intended to
be annexed. The jury found the annexation unreasonable. The trial
judge accepted the jury finding. The supreme court cited in support
of its decision reversing the trial judge and jury that (1) property
values of farm land adjacent to the city were higher than for farm
land elsewhere; (2) abortive attempts had been made by some person
or persons to incorporate the annexed area; and (3) no allegation of
personal misconduct of any member of the city council was made.
Relative property values would be irrelevant under the statutory
criterion. Where such relative values are material, the issue is
whether the increase in value is due to proximity to a market or
because of urban use of the land.21 The attempted incorporation was
alleged to be a sham, and it was not successful.
The net effect of the opinion of the supreme court is that in order
to establish that a finding of a city council of grounds for annexation
is not reasonable it is necessary to establish that the action was
arbitrary. To establish arbitrariness, apparently, it is necessary to
establish specific misconduct of members of the council.
Since the council is not a legislative body with reference to the
21. State v. Kansas City, 233 Mo. 162, 134 S.W. 1007 (1911) cited and
approved in State v. City of Joplin, supra note 11.
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territory to be annexed, and the Tennessee court held that the issue
is not whether particular criteria are met but is a political issue, it
follows that the delegation of legislative power is unlawful. I am
constrained to agree with counsel for those protesting annexation
that the supreme court opinion denies meaningful judicial review to
residents of the annexed territory.
Involuntary annexation by representatives of one of the interested
areas, not subject to judicial review except for provable misconduct
of such representatives, not limited by reasonable and enforceable
criterions is a procedure so autocratic as to demand corrective action
either by legislation or constitutional amendment or reversal of the
decision.
III. CONFLICTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

A. School Bond Allocation
Chief Justice Neil delivered the opinion of the Tennessee Supreme
Court in City of Elizabethton v. Boone, 22 affirming a decree of Judge
Campbell in a declaratory judgment action. At issue was the proper
formula for allocation of school bond receipts between Carter County
and the City of Elizabethton. Tennessee Code Annotated section 49711 (Supp. 1959) requires the county trustee to pay over to the city
treasurer (where county and city operate independent schools) such
an amount of school funds as "shall bear the same ratio to the entire
amount... as the average daily attendance of the year ending June
30 next preceding the sale of the bonds of said county .... "
Prior to sale of the bonds and during the referendum election
thereon it was agreed that the ratio should be based on the average
daily attendance of the schools, city and county, grades 1-12. However
the county claimed, prior to distribution of the proceeds of the bond
sale, that the ratio should be calculated for elementary grades and
high school grades separately and paid on that proportion. The
difference in the two methods of computation was substantial. In
support of its claim Carter County cited section 49-603 which requires reports of school superintendents on average daily attendance
to be made on June 30 of each year, separately for elementary schools
and high schools. The supreme court ruled that the construction of
section 49-711 requested by Carter County was not proper and
would do violence to the language of that statute, nor would construction in pari materia require such construction, since the mere
severance of reports of high and grade school attendance does not
require separate fund allocation of bonds sold for general school
purposes.
22. 329 S.W.2d 832 (Tenn. 1959).
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The case of Guffee v. Crockett,2 was distinguished by Justice Neil.
The bonds were limited to high school purposes in that case, and it
was held proper to allocate funds on the ratio of average daily
attendance in high school in that cause. Comparison of the decisions
provides a stable and reasonable formula: Funds from bonds sold
for general school purposes will be distributed to independent city
schools in proportion to the ratio of average daily attendance of
grades 1-12; if the bonds are sold for elementary school purposes the
ratio will be established on elementary school average daily attendance figures, and if for high school purposes, high school average
attendance figures will be used.
This leaves the question of whether special purpose school bonds
not broken along lines where statistics are required to be submitted
for allocation of state funds could be allocated on any basis other than
either total average daily attendance grades 1-12 or elementary grades
or high school. County officials might be well advised to avoid such
special purpose bonds.
Tennessee Code Annotated sections 49-603 and 49-711 were both
supplanted by Tennessee Public Acts chapter 53 (1959), but the
supreme court noted that the 1959 act carries the same general
proviso concerning allocation and ratio. It is probable that the
methods of allocation established by the cases above noted are not
affected by the statutory change.
IV. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE PERSONS
A. Contract
In State v. Stewart, Judge Bejach wrote the opinion of the Western Section Court of Appeals reversing a decree of Chancellor Cox.
The action was brought by Southern Oil and Grease Co., a partnership, and by the several partners against Henderson County, the superintendent of schools and his surety, and the members of the
county board of education, in the name of the state. The action against
the superintendent of schools and his surety was dismissed by the
chancellor and not appealed. Decree was entered against Henderson
County and its board of education for $653.87 for supplies contracted
for by the superintendent of schools and delivered.
The issue was the proper effect of Tennessee Private Acts chapter
642 (1947), which provides for a purchasing agent for Henderson
County, an elective official, and further provides that Henderson
County "shall not be liable . . ." for purchases made contrary to the
provisions of the act vesting exclusive power in the purchasing agent
24

23. 315 S.W.2d 646 (Tenn. 1958), 12 VA=. L. REV. 1257, 1260 (1959).

24. 326 S.W.2d 688 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
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to buy materials, supplies and equipment for the county.
The court of appeals decided that the purchasing agent was not a
ministerial officer, and impliedly negatived any compulsory process
to require him to ratify the sale. The court further held that no
recovery on the quantum meruit was allowable, following Kreis &
Co. v. City of Knoxville, 25 wherein the supreme court held that a
compromise and ratification of a void contract for service would
not avail the contractor where the city charter expressly prohibited
remuneration for services not contracted for in writing and approved
by a board of commissioners; and Carter County v. Williams, 26 which
contains a summary of Tennessee cases and draws a distinction between cases where execution of the contract was contrary to a specific
legal inhibition such as the Kreis & Co. case and cases where the
irregularity in execution did not violate a specific proscription,
such as Bozeman v. State2 7 which is discussed below. The instant case
falls within the class of the Kreis case.
This is a harsh decision, yet the position of the court of appeals is
readily justified by the necessity for organized planning of municipal
expenditures. However, it would seem that such policy could be
more equitably carried out by providing for punitive measures against
public officials who exceed their authority by such contracts and
reserving the rather harsh remedy of forfeiture for cases in which the
supplier engaged in fraud or collusion.
In the Bozeman'2 case the Tennessee Supreme Court sustained a
judgment of Judge Kelly granting mandamus against the judge of
Knox County Quarterly Court, requiring payment of attorney's fees.
Tennessee Private Acts chapter 183 (1937), created a board of
county commissioners for Knox County and transferred some powers
and duties from the quarterly county court. Internal warfare ensued
in the course of which relator was employed by the quarterly court
to assist in test litigation, including cases nominally involving private
parties.29 The contention that payment for relator's services would
be expending county funds to aid private individuals was disposed of
by Justice Tomlinson by reference to the finding that the cases were
maintained for the benefit of the county, citing Reece v. Polk
County,30 in which it was held that testing constitutionality of acts
imposing a burden on a county was a proper county function and that
the mode in which the test was effectuated was irrelevant.
25. 145 Tenn. 297, 237 S.W. 55 (1921).

26. 28 Tenn. App. 352, 190 S.W.2d 311 (1945).

27. 330 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. 1959).
28. Ibid.
29. Bayless v. Maynard, 200 Tenn. 568, 292 S.W.2d 774 (1956); State v.
Armstrong, 200 Tenn. 191, 292 S.W.2d 7 (1956).
30. 3 Tenn. Civ. App. 354 (1912).
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It was also contended that the contract of employment of relator
was void because authorized at a special call of the quarterly court
and the matter of legal services was not included in the call. The
employment was ratified at a later session, however, and the defect
in initial employment was treated as a mere irregularity by the court.
The disputed payment covered all legal services, some of which
were rendered prior to the ratification. Tennessee Private Acts chapter
231 (1939) provides that no county officer shall employ counsel without "first" obtaining authority of the quarterly court. The supreme
court held, however, that the act applies to officers but not to the
quarterly court itself. It is clear that the distinction between this
case and State v. Stewart3' is rather attenuated, although justifiable
in a technical sense.In Bybees Branch Water Association v. Town of McMinnville32 the
supreme court ruled that a municipal corporation acts in a proprietarial or quasi-public utility capacity when it contracts to supply
water to private users in the course of a regular business of maintaining a waterworks system and supplying water to customers both
within and without the municipality. In an opinion by Chief Justice
Prewitt, the court affirmed the decree of Chancellor Garrett ordering
specific performance of such a contract to provide water at the same
rate as users within the corporate limits, thereby voiding an ordinance
purporting to increase the rates to complainants to 50% more than
the rates of in-town users.
B. Tort
The double fiction of Sovereignty and Infallibility still is in force
in Tennessee. Although many states have discarded as inapplicable,
or severely curtailed, the doctrine that "The King can do no Wrong"
which reflects a synonymous relation between Power and Right,
Tennessee has taken little direct legislative or judicial action to provide
33
remedies against local governments.
However, a note of hope is sounded by the Tennessee Supreme Court
in its decision in Ballew v. City of Chattanooga.34 Ballew sued Chattanooga for damage resulting from the alleged negligent operation of
a motor vehicle belonging to Chattanooga by a police officer. City's
demurrer was sustained by the circuit judge. In an opinion by Justice
Tomlinson, the supreme court reversed and remanded for trial.
The city contended that failure to join the officer was a fatal defect,
but the court summarily disposed of the point in accordance with the
31. Note 24 supra.

32. 333 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1960).

33. For criticism of the doctrine see, inter alia, Annot., 75 A.L.R. 1196 (1931).
34. 326 S.W.2d 466 (Tenn. 1959).
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overwhelming weight of authority in actions based on the doctrine of
respondeat superior. 35
The main issue was whether immunity from suit was waived by
Ordinance No. 4045 of the defendant. The ordinance was passed to
effectuate a self-insurance scheme, and provided for a substantial
contribution to a fund for payment of claims from the police and fire
department budgets. The ordinance required the city attorney to
investigate and settle claims and actions arising from operation of
city motor equipment where there is "legal liability."
The city argued that the police officer was acting in a governmental
rather than a proprietary capacity, that immunity attached, and,
therefore, no "legal liability" of the city followed. The court, however, implied an- intention to waive immunity from the fact that the
ordinance required contribution from police and fire funds. The court
said policemen and firemen act in a governmental capacity at all
times, 36 and the contribution from their budget evidenced an expectation that "legal liability" could attach to their acts.
The decision indicates a tendency to limit the effect of immunity as
far as possible without overturning prior decisions. It seems clear
that the theory on which Chattanooga was sued, and on which the
court ruled, was respondeat superior, but there are serious difficulties
to the application of that theory which apparently were not brought
to the attention of the court.
It has been held that a police officer is not an agent or servant of
the city or town which employs him.37 It has also been held that a
city is not liable in negligence for selection or retention of police
officers who are known to be insane3 8 or of violent character.39
Although those cases may have turned on the immunity question, it
is clear that the status of a police officer is not that of a servant, but
that he holds a state office of public trust.4 0 There is considerable
doubt whether there is "legal liability" on a theory of respondeat
superior for negligence of a police officer, although the City of
Chattanooga is bound by the decision. It is to be noted that no
such status problem exists with reference to firemen, and the
ordinance is not necessarily inconsistent with a waiver of immunity
in cases based on negligence of firemen and no liability for negligent
actions by police officers.
35. 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 579 (1948) (to the effect that liability of
master and servant is several or joint and several).
36. See generally, 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 775, note 25 (1950);
but see Howard v. Chattanooga, 170 Tenn. 663, 98 S.W.2d 510 (1936).
37. Cuffman v. City of Nashville, 175 S.W.2d 331 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1943);
19 R.C.L. § 398 (1917).
38. Bobo v. City of Kenton, 186 Tenn. 515, 212 S.W.2d 363 (1948) (Neil, J.).

39. Combs v. City of Elizabethton, 318 S.W.2d 691 (Tenn. 1960) (Green,
C. J.).
40. State v. Knoxville, 166 Tenn. 530, 64 S.W.2d 7 (1933).

